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A Black Presidential 
Candidacy (1984)
By Robert C. Smith and Joseph R  McCormick, I I
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An Assessment
(First of two parts)
ow effective was Jesse L. Jackson’s 
1984 campaign for the Democratic 
presidential nomination?
How one evaluates the Jackson 
campaign depends on the standards or 
criteria employed in the framework of this 
analysis. The core of our framework is 
found in a set of criteria we advanced in an 
earlier essay, “The Challenge of A Black 
Presidential Candidacy/’ which was pub­
lished in New Directions last year. (See 
Vol. 11, April, 1984, pp. 38-43).
In developing the analytic framework for 
the first article, we proposed that Jack­
son’s candidacy be evaluated on the basis 
of its “potential to (1) contribute to the de­
velopm ent of an authentic liberal- 
progressive agenda and constituency and 
(2) its potential to contribute to Black polit­
ical empowerment, independence, and 
leverage in American electoral politics.1 
We wrote:
“Our assessment of the success of the cam­
paign is based not on the number of dele­
gates obtained, nor on whether the Demo­
cratic front-runner or Reagan [is] helped 
or hurt, but instead on the nature of Jack- 
sons definition of the Black predicament 
and the consequent ideology and policies he 
argues are necessary to address that pre­
dicament. Also, this assessment is based 
on the extent to which Jackson is willing to 
challenge the Democratic Party in order to 
build an independent base of Black power 
in the party system. ”2
Thus, two challenges emerged from 
that essay: the challenge of ideology and 
the challenge of political independence. On 
these two points, we observed, “these are 
the fundamental challenges of and to Jack- 
son. The success or failure of his cam­
paign, in the final analysis, will be deter­
mined on the basis of how he and the party 
system meet these challenges.”3
This report, therefore, is a quasi- 
systematic attempt to gauge the impact of
the Jackson campaign on the American 
party system and presidential selection 
process, and on the strategy and tactics of 
Black political empowerment in the United 
States.
In addition to these core criteria of 
assessment, we also evaluate the impact 
of the campaign on Black voter registration 
and turnout, and on the outcome of the 
Democratic Party nomination and the gen­
eral election. In the second part of this 
report, we offer some tentative generaliza­
tions regarding the long-term effects of the 
campaign on the symbolism and structure 
of Afro-American community and politics.
This report is a preliminary assessment 
— first, because of the tentative and in­
complete status of relevant data (the quad­
rennial survey of the national election by 
the University of Michigan’s Center for 
Political Studies is an indispensable source 
for systematic assessment of the cam­
paign); second, because the effects of 
Jackson’s challenge continue to unfold, and 
indeed will continue to do so in the months 
and years ahead as the Democratic Party’s 
constituency groups attempt to chart a 
new direction in light of the challenge of 
independent Black politics and the continu­
ing defection of key white constituency 
groups in the 1984 general election.
Black Voter Registration and Turnout
Since the late 1960s, the dominant strat­
egy in Black politics has involved participa­
tion in the electoral process.4 As a result, 
the principal concern of Black leadership 
has been to increase the size and leverage 
of the Black vote, which is potentially sig­
nificant because of its size (more than 10% 
of the national electorate), its concentra­
tion in the large cities and states and be­
cause it is usually highly cohesive. But the 
fact that Blacks vote at a lower rate than 
whites seriously undermines the actual 
significance of the vote. Since 1964, the 
percentage of Blacks of voting age who ac­
tually voted has declined by 8%, from 59% 25
in 1964 to 51% in 1980, while among white 
voters it declined from 71% to 61%.5 Thus, 
a major goal of Black American leadership 
has been to halt and reverse this decline in 
Black voter participation and narrow the 
approximately 10% gap in Black and white 
voting rates.
This goal of increased Black registration 
and voting was also a primary goal of the 
Jackson campaign. Jackson argued that 
Blacks were more likely to register and 
vote if they had a credible Black candidate 
to vote for, and those Black voters added 
to the rolls during the primary campaign 
could be a powerful force in supporting the 
Democratic nominee in his effort to unseat 
President Ronald Reagan, and in contribut­
ing to the election of Blacks and progres­
sive whites at the state and local level in 
1984 and beyond.
As Jackson himself wrote in the Wash­
ington Post: “Eighteen million eligible 
Black voters can be the cornerstone of a 
new ‘coalition of the rejected’ (the real si­
lent majority) that can create new political 
options for 1984.”6 During his “Southern 
Crusade” in the summer of 1983, Jackson 
joined with other Black organizations (Op­
eration Big Vote, the NAACP and the A. 
Phillip Randolph Institute) in a coordinated 
campaign to increase Black voter registra­
tion. And this effort resulted in a significant 
increase in Black registration and voting in 
the primaries, especially in the South.
(See Table 1.) Overall, 695,000 Blacks 
were added to the voter rolls in southern 
states prior to the Democratic primaries, 
while among whites there was a net loss of 
227,000 voters. Thus, between 1980 and 
the spring of 1984, Black voter registration 
in the South increased by 8.5% while white 
registration declined by nearly 10%.
Similar voter registration figures are not 
available outside the South. However, ob­
servers in major urban centers of the 
North — New York, Chicago, Los Ange-
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les, Philadelphia and Baltimore— indicate 
there was a similar upsurge in Black regis­
tration in the period leading up to the 
Democratic primaries. In addition, in a 
survey conducted by the Gallup organiza­
tion for the Washington-based Joint Center 
for Political Studies, 7% of a sample of the 
national Black community’s voting age 
population reported registering since 
1982, compared to 4% of voting age 
whites; 65% of the Black respondents re­
ported that Jackson’s campaign had made 
them more likely to vote.7 Therefore, ac- 
26 cording to available data, a significant in­
crease in Black voter registration has oc­
curred. The data also indicate that Jack­
son’s campaign may, at least in part, be 
responsible for this development.8
The increased Black voter registra­tion apparently translated into in­creased Black voter turnout in the Democratic primaries. Indeed, it is 
probable that for the first time in the his­
tory of the Democratic Party’s nomination 
process Black Americans voted in the 
primaries at a greater rate than white 
Americans. (See Table 2.) The turnout in 
selected Democratic primaries in 1984 
shows that in every state it was greater in 
“Black areas” than in the state as a whole. 
Increased Black turnout from 1980 to 1984 
ranged from 14% in Georgia to 127% in 
New York State. This compares to an 
overall increase in Democratic primary 
voting of 4% between 1980 and 1984. This 
massive increase in Black participation in 
the Democratic primaries must be attribu­
ted, in large measure, to the enthusiasm 
generated by Jackson’s campaign.
The increased Black registration and 
voting during the primaries apparently was 
not as widespread in the November gen­
eral election. In the South, during the 
period after the party conventions, Blacks 
continued to register at a higher rate than 
whites but the resulting additions to the 
voter rolls were not as favorable to Black 
voter interests, given the respective popu­
lation bases of whites and Blacks in the 
general electorate when compared to the 
Democratic Party electorate. For exam­
ple, in Georgia in the post convention 
period, Black registration increased by 
15.6%, compared to an increase of 9.7% in 
white registration. But these percentages 
translated into an increase of 170,211 new 
white voters, compared to 74,485 new 
Black voters. Similarly in Louisiana, a 
11.4% Black increase in registration
yielded 14,525 new voters while a more 
modest 6.6% white increase yielded 
40,844 new white voters.9 As a result, al­
though the Democratic Party and its con­
stituent groups— including Blacks— were 
able to increase Black registration, a simi­
lar effort by the Republican Party and its 
constituent groups — especially the white 
southern evangelical church — were able 
with less proportionate success to in­
crease the white vote and in effect cancel 
the impact of the much greater proportion­
ate success of the Black registration ef­
fort.
Nevertheless, Black voters did consti­
tute a larger proportion of the newly regis­
tered voters in 1984 and a larger propor­
tion of the general electorate as a whole.
“The most basic explana­
tion for the failure of the 
Black vote to play the 
anticipated balance of 
power role was the land­
slide character of Presi­
dent Reagan’s victory. ”
The New York Times-CBS News election 
day exit poll found that 12% of Black vot­
ers, compared to 8% of white voters, were 
casting ballots for the first time.10 And the 
Washington Post-kBC  News exit poll 
found that Blacks constituted 10% of the 
electorate in November, an increase of 1% 
from the 1980 general election.11
Overall, however, in contrast to Black 
voter participation in the 1984 primaries 
where there was a significant and influen­
tial upsurge, in the general election the 
picture is mixed. The Joint Center esti­
mates that Black turnout in the general 
election increased in the South by 5.3% 
over the 1980 figure, but that there was 
little or no increase among Blacks outside 
of the South.12 Consequently, the expec­
tation of Jesse Jackson and other Black 
political leaders that increased Black voter 
registration might alter the electoral col­
lege balance in favor of the Democratic 
ticket did not materialize.
The most basic explanation for the fail­
ure of the Black vote to play the anticipated 
balance of power role was the landslide 
character of President Reagan’s victory. In
addition, Black voters, for a variety of rea­
sons— the Democratic candidates’ lack of 
attention to Black policy concerns during 
the fall campaign, disappointment and dis­
affection among some Black voters as a 
result of Jackson’s defeat and the percep­
tion among some Black voters as well that 
Jackson and his constituency were not 
fairly treated by the Democratic Party and 
its nominees— did not vote in the Novem­
ber election in the numbers Jackson ex­
pected his candidacy to generate.
The Democratic Primaries and 
Caucuses
Jesse Jackson announced his candidacy on 
November 3, 1983, much later than all of 
the other candidates. This late start re­
sulted in a good deal of confusion and lack 
of coordination in the early stages of the 
campaign’s organization.
Jackson’s organization was composed of 
longtime associates of his Chicago-based 
Operation PUSH and a range of outside 
politicians, clergymen and academicians 
(including some Howard University faculty 
members: Professor Ronald Walters of the 
Political Science Department as deputy 
campaign manager for issues and strategy 
development; Robert Browne of the Afri­
can Studies and Research Program and 
Mary Berry, professor of history and law, 
as senior policy advisors).
In structure— field operations, schedul­
ing, fundraising, press, issue develop­
ment, legal counsel, etc. — the Jackson 
campaign organization was similar to that 
of other recent presidential campaigns, 
with most decision-making authority cen­
tered in the candidate and a few of his 
closest aides. There were, however, sev­
eral distinctive features of the Jackson 
campaign organization.
First, unlike most presidential cam­paigns that rely on state and local political organizations and/or estab­lished and experienced operatives 
from previous presidential campaigns, 
Jackson’s core, grassroots organizational 
base was the Black church and its national 
network of clergy. The Black church and 
clergy were a source of both financial and 
organizational support throughout the 
campaign. If Jackson had not been able to 
draw on this national netw ork of 
preachers, it is doubtful he could have sus­
tained a national campaign for nearly 10 
months, especially given the relative ab­
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sence of more traditional sources of cam­
paign support.
A second distinctive characteristic of 
the Jackson campaign was the “constitu­
ency desks.” The constituency desks 
were a part of the campaign’s effort to build 
a multi-ethnic and multi-issue coalition. 
Thus, the campaign included full-time 
coordinators for key constituent elements 
of the Rainbow Coalition.
Although Jackson made a systematic or­
ganizational effort to reach beyond the 
Black community to other constituencies, 
a third distinctive feature of his campaign 
was its outreach to the range of ideological 
persuasions within the Black community 
itself. Jackson was able to bring into the 
political process, for the first time, mem­
bers of the Nation of Islam, a group that on 
ideological and philosophical grounds had 
long eschewed participation in the estab­
lished American political process. This, in 
part, explains Jackson’s controversial 
campaign relationship with Minister Louis 
Farrakhan. Looking back on the continu­
ous relationship between Malcolm X and 
Martin Luther King in the 1960s, Jackson 
told Lerone Bennett of Ebony magazine:
“That is why I  keep reaching out. You see, 
before, historically, we did not spiritually 
unify Blacks of different ideological per­
suasions . . .  This time we've involved the 
Nationalists, whether its Herb Daughtery 
or Farrakhan. We are molding our com­
munity together. Now those who seek to 
gain from division in our community have 
done everything to break that up. The price 
we pay for expansion into the broader com­
munity cannot be the disintegration of our 
community. That costs too much. We don't 
support a white candidate based upon the 
behavior of all of his white supporters. 13
Jackson’s late start and relatively inex­
perienced staff also affected the financing 
of the campaign— a campaign without ac­
cess to large institutional or individual con­
tributions. The Jackson campaign needed 
extensive prior fund raising activity if it 
were to qualify for federal matching funds, 
which require a candidate to receive at 
least $5,000 in each of 20 states with a 
maximum contribution of $250 per indi­
vidual by check or money order. Given this 
disadvantage, Jackson’s campaign relied on 
television debate parties, concerts and 
“passing the plate” at rallies and during 
church services. These efforts resulted in 
substantial cash contributions which, 
under the federal law, did not qualify for 
federal matching funds. Thus, the Jackson
campaign, compared to his principal com­
petitors, was handicapped by a shortage of 
funds and a near constant cash flow prob­
lem.
An examination of campaign contri­
butions and disbursements of the principal 
Democratic candidates shows the dispar­
ity between the Jackson campaign and 
those of his two major opponents. Federal 
Election Commission data show that as of 
August 31, 1984, Vice President Walter 
Mondale’s campaign spent $32,852,724, 
Senator Gary H art’s $22,175,047 and 
Jesse Jackson’s $6,669,026. Indeed, the 
Election Commission data show that Jack- 
son raised and spent less than all of the 
eight candidates, except Senators Ernest 
Hollings and George McGovern and Gov-
“Jackson’s support in the 
Black community cut 
across all demographic 
categories. ”
ernor Rubin Askew. (Two other candi­
dates, John Glenn and Alan Cranston, 
dropped out early in the spring while Jack- 
son campaigned through the July conven­
tion.)
This financial disparity seriously handi­
capped Jackson’s candidacy because, un­
like his opponents, Jackson was unable to 
afford a paid media advertising campaign. 
Thus, he could not present a coherent 
image and agenda to the electorate, rather 
he had to rely on regular media coverage.
In a presidential campaign, the bulk of 
campaign expenditures are for the prepa­
ration and marketing of television advertis­
ing. In the Jackson campaign, the largest 
expenditures were for travel, staff support 
and fund raising. To the extent, therefore, 
that effective competition in presidential 
politics requires an extensive and expen­
sive media campaign, Jackson was not at all 
competitive. As he quipped during the 
campaign, “If Hart or Mondale had my 
budget, they could not compete. And if I 
had their budgets they could not com­
pete.”
In spite of these organizational and fin­
ancial disadvantages, Jackson was re­
markably successful in the Democratic 
primaries and caucuses. In a field of eight 
nationally known Democratic politicians, 
Jackson was able to survive the long tortu­
ous process of more than 50 primaries and 
caucuses and end up as one of the three 
final contenders for the nomination. He 
won, for example, the majority of the vote 
in the District of Columbia, Louisiana, Vir­
ginia and South Carolina. In addition, Jack- 
son won the urban vote, carrying such 
cities as Philadelphia, Newark Atlanta, 
Little Rock, New Orleans, St. Louis, 27 
Charleston, Chicago and New York. (See 
Table 3.)
The data show that Jackson’s fundamen­
tal base of support was in the Black com­
munity. In the early primaries in Alabama 
and Georgia, Jackson received 50% and 
60% of the Black vote and less than 1% of 
the white vote, with Mondale receiving the 
vast majority of the remaining Black vote. 
However, as the primary season devel­
oped, Jackson’s percentage of the Black 
vote steadily increased until he was receiv­
ing 75-85% of the total vote, while his per­
centage of the white vote did not in any 
state exceed 10%.
Nationwide, it is estimated that Jackson 
received 85% of the votes cast by Black 
voters during the primaries. Thus, in spite 
of the rhetoric of the campaign about a 
multi-ethnic Rainbow Coalition, the Jack- 
son Campaign was fundamentally a Black 
candidacy rooted in the Black community’s 
historic quest for political empowerment 
and racial justice.14
Jackson’s support in the Black com­munity cut across all demographic categories. In the early southern primaries, young and rural Blacks 
were slightly more favorable to Jackson 
than older and urban Blacks. However, by 
the end of the primary season, as the cam­
paign picked up momentum and began to 
take on the characteristics of a movement, 
Jackson started receiving support from all 
strata of the community.15
Although he received less than 10% of 
the white primary vote, of the 3.4 million 
votes cast for Jackson, an estimated 22% 
(737,800) were from whites. The largest 
white vote for Jackson was cast in Califor­
nia where he received 9% or 285,000 
votes. Among Hispanics, Jackson received 
33% of the Puerto Rican vote in New York 
and 17% of the Mexican-American vote in 
California. Among Asian-Americans, it is
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estimated that Jackson received 25% of 
the vote in New Jersey and 20% in Califor­
nia. Also, Arab-Americans voted for Jack- 
son in overwhelming numbers; he re­
ceived 5% of the Jewish vote in New York 
and 8% in California.
Overall, Jackson received 18% of the 
Democratic primary vote, Mondale 39% 
and Hart 36%. But in the allocation of the 
delegates, Jackson received a dispro­
portionate 9% while Mondale received 
49% and Hart 36% of the delegates.16 This 
was due to the Democratic Party’s Hunt 
28 Commission rules that were put into effect 
a year or so prior to the opening primaries. 
The manifest purpose of the rules was to 
advantage well organized candidates with 
traditional party support and disadvantage 
insurgent, minority (political, not racial) 
candidates.
Under the rules’ “threshold” provision, 
a candidate, in order to receive any dele­
gates in a particular congressional district, 
had to receive a minimum share of the vote 
(generally 20%) in that congressional dis­
trict and a similar share of the statewide 
vote in order to receive any delegates. In 
addition, so called “winner take all,” “win­
ner take more” and other “bonus” provi­
sions of the rules operated to further de­
prive Jackson of the share of the delegates 
he earned on the basis of his popular vote 
in the primaries and caucuses.
Jackson and his supporters vigorously 
challenged these rules throughout the 
campaign to no avail. As a result, Mondale 
received the nomination with a majority of 
convention delegates, although he re­
ceived only a minority of the votes cast by 
Democrats who voted in the primaries and 
caucuses. Under a different set of rules, 
more nearly approximating one man, one 
vote, Jackson would have received about 
twice the number of delegates, Mondale 
considerably less, and Hart’s share prob­
ably would have been little changed. As a 
consequence, the Democratic Convention 
probably would have been deadlocked and 
Jesse Jackson’s bargaining power and 
leverage at the convention substantially 
enhanced.
The Democratic Party, as a result of 
Jackson’s protests, established a so-called 
“Fairness Commission” to consider re­
writing the delegate allocation rules prior 
to the 1988 election.18
The Challenge of Ideology
Jesse Jackson’s campaign may be cred­
ited with some success in increasing Black
registration and voting, and in mobilizing 
the Black community in support of his can­
didacy. However, Jackson’s candidacy, we 
believe, failed to meet the challenge of 
ideology in large part because he elected 
to challenge the party on electoral rules 
and procedures rather than on issues and 
ideology.
In setting  forth  the challenge of 
ideology, we argued that it was imperative 
that a Black presidential candidate develop 
and articulate a liberal-progressive agenda 
in order to (1) counteract the conservative 
drift of the Democratic Party, a conserva­
tive drift pushed by right wing southern 
Democrats and (2) because such an agenda 
is necessary to address the fundamental 
social and economic problems confronting 
the Afro-American community.19
Although we did not attempt to develop 
in detail the items that constitute what we 
called the “unfinished agenda of American 
liberalism, ” the following were set forth as 
a minimalist’s program: (1) full employ­
ment, (2) education reform, (3) national 
health insurance, (4) military reform and 
defense reductions, (5) welfare reform, (6) 
industrial policy and (7) affirmative ac­
tion.20 We argued, further, that the “cen­
tral item on this agenda is the development 
of a comprehensive set of policies de­
signed to achieve full employment in a rela­
tively short period of time [because] long 
term and persistent unemployment is the 
major causal factor in the development of 
the Black underclass and the ‘tangle of 
pathologies’ (female headed households, 
crime, drug addiction, welfare depend­
ency, alcoholism, etc.) that characterize 
this part of the Black community.”21
Although Jackson’s official campaign 
agenda or platform titled “A New Direc­
tion” addressed each of the items on our 
liberal agenda — with special emphasis on 
employment and industrial policy — in a 
series of well reasoned and feasible 
planks, 22 in his press conferences, debate 
appearances and stump speeches he un­
fortunately elected to emphasize reform of 
party rules and electoral procedures 
rather than substantive policy matters.28
Christopher Edley, in a Washington 
Post essay, wrote: “Reading the recent 
press reports one might be led to believe 
that Jackson is running for President in 
order to reform the Democratic Party, 
rather than to preach and teach. Yet for 
me, at least, the chief attraction of his can­
didacy was the promise of adding color to
the policy debate. A brawl over rules is 
dangerously diverting. ” 24
Jackson’s focus on the Democratic Party 
rules regarding delegate allocation is to 
some extent understandable since he be­
lieved, correctly, that the Hunt Commis­
sion rules unfairly deprived his constit­
uency of fair and equitable representation 
at the party convention and thereby de­
prived him of bargaining power and lever­
age in convention decision-making with re­
spect to the party nominees and plat­
form.25
Jackson’s focus on abolition of the sec­
ond primary, an issue that he at one point 
labeled a “litmus test” for his support of 
the party and its nominee, is less under­
standable. The second primary— the pro­
cedure employed in the southern states 
requiring a second or a run-off election if 
no candidate receives a majority in a 
multi-candidate race— apparently became 
a matter of concern to Jackson as a result 
of his “Southern Crusade” the year before 
he announced his candidacy. During this 
“crusade” to register and empower south­
ern Blacks, Jackson was told by a number 
of Black leaders (especially in Mississippi) 
that the second primary was a major ob­
stacle to effective Black political empow­
erment in the region. As a result, Jackson 
decided to make abolition of the second 
primary (and associated discriminatory 
procedures employed in the South, such as 
gerrymandering, at-large elections, dual 
registration and single shot voting) the 
major issue focus of the campaign.
There is considerable debate among 
historians, political scientists, journalists, 
legal scholars and politicians regarding the 
origins and consequences of the second 
primary and the probable effects of its abo­
lition on southern politics and Black politi­
cal empowerment.26 But the merits of the 
issue notwithstanding, we believe that it 
was a fundamental strategic error for 
Jackson to elevate this problem to the 
status of the “litmus test” issue of the 
campaign because of its predictable effect 
of shifting media attention away from the 
employment crisis in the Black commu­
nity, a crisis which should have been the 
litmus test issue of the campaign.
The result was that the ideological challenge of the campaign was blurred, leaving mass opinion with the impression that the purpose of 
Jackson’s candidacy was to abolish the 
second primary, reform the Democratic 
Party or perhaps secure a homeland for
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White registration Black registration
State 1980 1984 Change 1980 1984 Change
Alabama 1,700.000 1,664,000 -  36,000 350,000 482,000 +132,000
Arkansas 1,056,000 964,000 -  92,000 130,000 155,000 + 25,000
Florida 4,331,000 4,337,000 + 6,000 489,000 517,000 + 28,000
Georgia 1,800,000 1,787,000 -  13,000 450,000 512,000 + 62,000
Louisiana 1,550,000 1,609,000 -  8,000 465,000 535,000 + 70,000
N. Carolina 2,314,000 2,369,000 + 55,000 440,000 565,000 +125,000
S. Carolina 916,000 848,000 -  68,000 320,000 331,000 + 11,000
Tennessee 2,200,000 2,082,000 -118,000 300,000 348,000 + 48,000
Texas 6,020,000 6,042.000 -  22,000 620,000 720,000 +100,000
Virginia 1,942,000 1,908,000 -  34,000 360,000 378,000 + 18,000
TOTAL 24,981,000 24,754,000 -227,000 4,254,000 4,949,000 +695,000
SOURCE: American Political Report and the Voter Education Project as reported in Focus 12 Oune 1984): 9. The figures are for the period 
through April. 1984.
State Black areas* State total
Alabama + 87% +71%
Florida + 38 + 7
Georgia + 14 -3 4
Illinois + 19 +37
New York + 127 +37
Pennsylvania + 32 -  2
Tennessee + 58 + 7
Indiana + 29 + 17
Maryland + 33 + 1
North Carolina + 53 +18
Ohio + 36 +21
New Jersey + 82 + 19
*Black Areas are precincts in which Blacks comprise 80% or more of the population.
SOURCE: Thomas Cavanagh and Lorn Foster, Jesse Jackson's Campaign: The. Primaries and Caucuses (Washington: Joint Center for Political 
Studies, 1984): 17.
BLACKS WHITES
State* Mon dale Jackson Glenn Hart Mondale Jackson Glenn Hart
Alabama 47% 50% 1% 1% 29% 1% 32% 37%
Georgia 30 61 1 5 32 1 25 38
Illinois 17 79 4 - 4 47 45
New York 8 87 3 57 6 - 36
Tennessee 18 77 - 2 51 2 - 43
Indiana 20 71 9 44 3 - 51
Maryland 13 83 1 53 5 - 35
North Carolina 13 84 1 46 3 - 41
Ohio 15 81 3 44 5 - 50
California 16 78 5 40 9 - 48
New Jersey 11 86 2 56 4 - 38
"The states are listed in the order that their primaries occurred.
SOURCE: New York Times — CBS News Exit Polls.
the Palestinians in Palestine. This distor­
tion of the ideological purposes of the cam­
paign was inevitable, given the complexity 
of the second primary issue, the tendency 
of the media to focus on trivia and the 
pseudo-dramatic (as the coverage of the 
“Hymie” and Farrakhan controversies il­
lustrate) and Jackson’s inability, for finan­
cial reasons, to present his own campaign 
agenda through a paid advertising cam­
paign.
Jackson’s failure to pursue issue clarity 
is also demonstrated by examination of the 
four minority planks presented for debate 
at the Democratic Convention. Two of the 
planks — affirmative action and reduction 
in military expenditures — correspond to 
our liberal agenda. The other issues pre­
sented— the second primary and adoption 
by the United States of a policy of “no first 
use” of nuclear weapons — did not. (The 
plank on nuclear weapons was an effort by 
Jackson to appeal to the peace constit­
uency.) Again, the effect of the debate on 
the four planks during the convention was 
to leave the campaign without a sharp 
ideological edge.27 In our view, Jackson 
would have better served his constituency 
and the strategic purposes of the campaign 
had he presented to the convention for de­
bate a single issue — a well-crafted pro­
gram for full employment.
A related aspect of the challenge of ideology was to prevent the Demo­cratic Party, its nominees and plat­form, from shifting to the right — a 
shift in strategy for the party that was ar­
ticulated in a series of speeches and arti­
cles by, among others, Bert Lance and 
Hamilton Jordan, proteges of former Pres­
ident Jimmy Carter. The leading right-of- 
center candidate in early 1984 was Senator 
John Glenn, who in the early polls led or 
was in a respectable second place to Vice 
President Mondale. (The other right-of- 
center candidates in the Democratic 
primaries were former Florida Governor 
Rubin Askew and South Carolina Senator 
Ernest Hollings.)
This aspect of the challenge of ideology 
was met, we believe, since the more con­
servative candidates for the nomination 
were eliminated early in the primary proc­
ess. The Jackson campaign, however, had 
relatively little effect on this outcome. This 
is because Blacks, the largest and indeed 
the core liberal constituency in the Demo­
cratic Party and Jackson’s candidacy, effec­
tively deprived the more liberal candidates 
(Mondale, McGovern, Hart and Cranston)
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of their support. But Vice President Mon­
dale, a traditional liberal, was able to elim­
inate his more conservative opponents in 
spite of Jackson’s dominance of the liberal 
Black vote. Mondale’s nomination can 
probably be accounted for in terms of a 
number of factors specific to the 1984 
nomination process.
First, Mondale had the support of virtu­
ally the entire Democratic Party estab­
lishment — labor, Jews, liberals and the 
majority of state and county party leaders. 
Second, Mondale had a better campaign 
organization than his rivals. Third, Mon­
dale’s campaign was be tte r financed. 
Fourth, the Hunt Commission rules fa­
vored a well organized, establishment type 
candidate such as Mondale. Fifth, Jack­
son’s candidacy notwithstanding, Mondale 
received significant support from Blacks, 
among them a number of mayors, mem­
bers of Congress and Atlanta’s influential 
King family. Finally, regarding the early 
elimination of Mondale’s more conserva­
tive opponents, the outcome of the 1984 
Democratic primaries indicate that mod­
erately conservative candidates can com­
mand only a fraction of the party’s pres­
idential electorate.
It has been clear at least since 1972 that 
the Democratic Party has shifted to the 
liberal center, in part as a result of the 
realignment of the two parties’ core con­
stituencies since the 1964 election. 
Senator Gary Hart’s second place finish in 
the 1984 Democratic primaries further 
supports this conclusion. Although on the 
basis of some of his demographic support 
(young and upwardly mobile white urban 
professionals or what the press boorishly 
labeled “Yuppies”) and ill-informed press 
coverage, Hart was frequently viewed as a 
conservative, especially in the Black 
community. However, a report by two 
political science professors at Howard 
found “significant common ground and 
mutuality of interests” on domestic issues 
between Hart’s “neoliberal” agenda and 
Jackson’s “Black” agenda.28
The outcome of the Democratic nomination was a trium ph for liberalism in the sense that the more conservative candidates were elimi­
nated early in the process and the three 
top vote getters were all representatives 
of the party’s liberal wing — Mondale the 
traditional liberal, Hart the neoliberal and 
Jackson the insurgent left-liberal.
Although Mondale’s nomination assured
that the party would not move in a sharp 
right wing direction, its San Francisco plat­
form is arguably the most conservative in a 
generation.29 The bulk of the platform 
consists of a series of long partisan attacks 
on the domestic and foreign policy record 
of the Reagan Administration, and on the 
specifics of the liberal agenda— a series of 
vague generalities.30
On the question of employment, the 
party refused to reaffirm its commitment 
to a full employment economy or propose 
specific policies to significantly reduce the 
unemployment rate. There was no men­
tion of national health insurance or welfare 
reform, traditional items in the party’s plat­
forms. And on defense spending, rather 
than repudiating the unprecedented Rea-
“Jackson would have 
better served his consti­
tuency and the strategic 
purposes of the campaign 
had he presented to the 
convention for debate a 
single issue— a well- 
crafted program for full 
employment. ”
gan build-up, the platform proposed only a 
modest slowdown in the rate of growth in 
military outlays.
Overall, while the Democratic platform 
was not a conservative document, neither 
was it a traditional liberal one. Rather, it 
was a centrist document that sought to ac­
commodate the apparent conservative 
mood of the middle class white elector­
ate.31 And, consistent with the platform, 
Mondale’s fall campaign was characterized 
by a cautious moderation, emphasizing 
fiscal austerity, tax increases and a bal­
anced budget. Put simply, the left-liberal 
challenge of a Black presidential candidacy 
was met by a cautious but clear movement 
from the left of center. □
Robert C. Smith and Joseph P. McCormick, II are 
faculty members of the Department of Political Sci­
ence at Howard University. The second part of their 
report will appear in our July issue.
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